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Abstract
Approval voting is an election method in which voters may cast votes for
as many candidates as they desire. This can be modeled mathematically by
associating to each voter an approval region: a set of potential candidates
they approve. In this thesis we add another level of approval somewhere
in between complete approval and complete disapproval. More than one
level of approval may be a better model for a real-life voter’s complex de-
cision making. We provide a new definition for intersection that supports
multiple levels of approval. The case of pairwise intersection is studied,
and the level of agreement among voters is studied under restrictions on
the relative size of each voter’s preferences. We derive upper and lower
bounds for the percentage of agreement based on the percentage of inter-
section.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The goal of voting theory is to make a mathematical model that represents
some aspects of real elections and voting. We care about issues of voting
since it forms the cornerstone of any democratic process. The ability to vote
gives people the ability to have a say in decisions that affect them, whether
by a government or other organizations. Although other situations arise
where voting is used, we will specifically investigate voting used to elect a
person (a candidate) to some position.
A candidate has to have some set of beliefs, or positions, they hold.
Following the terminology of Berg et al. (2010) we call each of these a plat-
form. The set of all possible platforms is called the spectrum. Throughout
this thesis we will assume that the spectrum is R, so that the spectrum is a
line. This could represent a scale of how, for example, liberal versus con-
servative that candidate is. It is also possible to use a spectrum of Rn if
candidates can be ranked on more then one scale (for example fiscal and
social).
In the United States a common type of voting for political candidates
is known as plurality voting. In this system a voter will choose the one
candidate they like best out of a list of potential candidates. However, there
also exist other voting systems.
This thesis will be concerned with a generalization of approval voting. In
approval voting each voter selects all of the candidates they approve (all
the candidates they find “acceptable”). Therefore each voter can cast a vote
for any number of candidates. The winner is the candidate that is selected
by the greatest number of voters. Several organizations use approval vot-
ing to elect candidates, including the Mathematical Association of America
and the American Mathematical Society. Taylor and Pacelli (2008) note that
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one advantage of approval voting is that it reduces the impact of spoiler
candidates, candidates who cannot win, yet prevent another candidate from
winning. One drawback is that it is not clear where a voter should make
the distinction between approval and disapproval when the platforms of
candidates are more complicated then the linear spectrum considered here.
Berg et al. (2010) have proven various results in approval voting the-
ory relating to what percentage of voters can be proven to agree on some
candidate given certain local conditions. It is possible to interpret a set of
voters in approval voting theory as an interval graph (defined in Section 2.3)
by giving each voter a vertex, and connecting two vertices with an edge
if and only the corresponding voters overlap. Using this idea, Abbott and
Katchalski (1979) proved a result for interval graphs that has direct impli-
cations for approval voting theory. This result relates the percentages of
edges in an interval graph to the largest clique (subgraph that is also a com-
plete graph) that must be in that graph. We show a similar interpretation
for a set of voters with multiple levels of approval as a tolerance graph
(described by Golumbic and Trenk (2004)). Chapter 2 provides more infor-
mation about these previously proven results.
In Chapter 3 we provide new definitions for a model of approval voting
theory with multiple levels of approval. We also give the details for the
correspondence between a set of voters and a tolerance graph. This chapter
also proves a generalization for a result from Berg et al. (2010).
In Chapter 4 we give generalizations for the results of Abbott and Ka-
tchalski (1979) regarding a lower bound on the number of voters that pair-
wise agree given how many voters agree overall. A corresponding upper
bound in also provided in that chapter.
Chapter 5 shows how to gain stronger result about pairwise intersection
by bounding the relative sizes of the different levels of approval. Motivat-
ing examples are provided to show why such bounds are desirable. Possi-
ble directions for future research are discussed in Chapter 6. Appendix A
describes a computer program that creates random arrangements of voters.
The source code is available through the Internet, and can be used to test
or devise new theorems.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we provide a summary of previous work that is related
to approval voting theory. Many results rely on understanding results in
number theory. These results are covered in the first section. Some theo-
rems from the work of Berg et al. (2010) related to approval voting theory
are presented. We explain the work of Abbott and Katchalski (1979) on in-
terval graphs. It is shown how this work relates to the theory of approval
voting. A background for tolerance graphs is also given. We will return to
the idea of tolerance graphs as a representation of approval voting theory
with two levels of approval in Section 3.2.
2.1 Useful Results from Graph Theory
In the introduction to their book on tolerance graphs, Golumbic and Trenk
(2004) provide a definition for interval graphs.
Definition 2.1 (Interval Graphs). A graph G = (V, E) is an interval graph if
every vertex, v, can be associated with an interval in R such that two vertices are
connected by an edge if and only if the corresponding intervals intersect.
The concept of an interval graph is important to the theory of approval
voting since each voter’s approval region is an interval. Thus by assigning
each voter a vertex and connecting vertices with edges if the corresponding
voters intersect produces an interval graph. Various theorems about the
properties of interval graphs play a key role in the proofs of the theorems
discussed in the following sections.
A clique is a subset of the vertices of a graph such that there is an edge
between every pair of vertices in the subset. A clique in an interval graph
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Figure 2.1 An example of pairwise intersecting intervals.
corresponds to a set of voters that pairwise intersect.
Definition 2.2 (Clique Number). The size of the largest clique in a graph G, the
clique number, is denoted by ω(G).
Theorem 2.1 (Helly’s Theorem). Pairwise intersecting intervals have a common
point.
Helly’s Theorem will be the basis for our first result from approval vot-
ing theory.
2.2 The Model of Berg et al.
Berg et al. (2010) consider the following model for approval voting. Each
political position is called a platform and the set of all platforms is the spec-
trum. Each voter has a set of platforms they approve. These are modeled
as closed intervals and are called the voter’s approval region. Helly’s The-
orem implies that if every pair of voters’ approval regions intersect, then
there is a platform in every approval region. Berg et al. (2010) call this the
Super-Agreeable Society Theorem.
Theorem 2.2 (Super-Agreeable Society Theorem). If every pair of voters have
intersecting approval regions then there is a platform in every voter’s approval
region.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of five pairwise intersecting voters. As
guaranteed by Theorem 2.2 we see that there is a platform in every interval.
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The paper also presents a similar theorem with a weaker hypothesis.
They call a set of voters (k, m)-agreeable if out of every m voters there are
k voters who have a point in common. Thus Theorem 2.2 considers those
sets of voters that are (2, 2)-agreeable. The more general theorem is called
the Agreeable Society Theorem.
Theorem 2.3 (Agreeable Society Theorem). Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Let n be the
number of voters. If a set of voters is (k, m)-agreeable then there is a platform that
has the approval of at least n(k− 1)/(m− 1) voters.
For example, this implies that if out of every three voters there are two
with a common platform then there exists some platform that has the ap-
proval of at least half of the voters. If such a platform were adopted by a
candidate they would have a good chance of winning the election.
2.3 Results of Abbott and Katchalski
Since voter’s preferences can be thought of as closed intervals in the real
line (in our model), interval graphs can be used to represent the intersec-
tions between voters. We create an interval graph from a set of voters by
assigning each voter a vertex and letting there be an edge between two ver-
tices if and only if the corresponding voters have a platform in common.
Abbott and Katchalski (1979) proved a lower bound for the largest clique
in an interval graph based on the percentage of possible edges the graph
has.
Theorem 2.4. Given an interval graph G, let N be the number of vertices in G,
and let E be the number of edges. Let α = E/(N2 ) (the percentage of possible edges)
and let β = ω(G)/N. Then we have
β ≥ 1−√1− α.
We care about the size of the largest clique that must exist in a graph
with N vertices and E edges because Theorem 2.2 implies that the voters
that correspond to the vertices in this clique have a platform in common
that they approve.
2.4 Tolerance Graphs
Tolerance graphs are a generalization of interval graphs. A tolerance graph
is a graph where every vertex can be assigned a closed interval in the real
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Figure 2.2 An example of intersecting and nonintersecting tolerance intervals.
line and a positive real number called the tolerance such that there is an
edge between two vertices if and only if the length of the overlap of the
corresponding intervals is at least the smaller tolerance (see Golumbic and
Trenk (2004)). Thus the idea of tolerance graphs is a generalization of in-
terval graphs. We will see later that tolerance graphs have an immediate
application to approval voting theory with two levels of approval.
As an example, the interval [−6, 2] with tolerance 2 and the interval
[−1, 9] with tolerance 4 would have an edge between their correspond-
ing vertices since the overlap has length 3, which is greater then min(2, 4).
However, the interval [−5, 0] with tolerance 2 and the interval [−1, 7] with
tolerance 3 would not have an edge between their vertices since their over-
lap has length 1 and 1 < min(2, 3). Figure 2.2 demonstrates these exam-
ples, with the first case shown at the top, and the second case shown at the
bottom. The red (solid) lines represent the interval while the blue (dashed)
lines represent the size of the tolerance.
We have seen that a set of voters can be modeled as an interval graph
under the model of Berg et al. (2010). We will see in Chapter 3 that we can
use a similar correspondence to model a set of voters in approval voting
theory with two levels of approval as a tolerance graph.
Chapter 3
Accounting for Two Levels of
Approval
In this chapter we give an interpretation of approval voting theory that
allows for voters to have multiple levels of approval. As previously stated,
approval voting is a system where each voter selects all the candidates they
approve. We will now allow the voters an opportunity to waver on certain
candidates. Each voter will still have some set of platforms they approve
of, but there will also be a set of platforms that they weakly approve of.
This could represent a region where they vote for each included candidate
with a 50% probability. This chapter will show how to interpret a set of
voters with two levels of approval as a tolerance graph. We also reinterpret
Theorem 2.2 and discuss pathological cases for the arrangement of voters.
3.1 Definitions
We let the set of all voters be denoted V. A voter v is described by four
points Lv, lv, rv, and Rv with Lv < lv < rv < Rv. We call [lv, rv] the voter’s
approval region, denoted by Av. Note that this is still modeled as a closed
interval as in approval voting theory. We call [Lv, lv) ∪ (rv, Rv] the voter’s
maybe region, denoted by Mv. If we need to be more specific, [Lv, lv) is
know as the left maybe region and (rv, Rv] is known as the right maybe region.
Together we call [Lv, Rv] = Av ∪ Mv the voter’s interest region, Iv, since
it contains all the platforms that voter shows any interest in. We see that
this represents a voter who strongly approves of a candidate taking any
position inside some closed interval, and might approve of a candidate that
is outside but close to the approval region. Figure 3.1 shows the four points
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Lv lv rv Rv
Figure 3.1 The four points that define a voter.
that define a voter. The approval region is shown in red (solid lines) and
the maybe region is shown in blue (dashed line).
Each platform, p, is given a value with respect to each voter v. The value
with respect to voter v is defined as
Vv(p) =

1 p ∈ AV
0.5 p ∈ Mv
0 otherwise.
The overall value for a platform is
V(p) = ∑
v∈V
Vv(p).
Two voters, u and v, are said to agree or intersect if there is a platform that
is approved by both voters, or is approved by one of the voters and is in
the maybe region of the other. We provide the following precise definition:
Definition 3.1 (Intersection). Two voters intersect if either Iu ∩ Av 6= ∅ or
Iv ∩ Au 6= ∅.
We see that this is equivalent to the existence of a platform p such that
Vu(p) +Vv(p) > 1.
We note that two voters’ maybe regions could have a point in common
without the voters intersecting, as shown in Figure 3.2. We see that the
value of the platform at the dotted line is 1 since the value of the platform
for each voter is 0.5. Since this is not strictly greater than 1, we see that
the voters also do not intersect by the alternate definition. The alternate
definition is provided since it would be easy to generalize to more than
two levels of approval.
3.2 Connection to Tolerance Graphs
As we have seen previously tolerance graphs are based on the intersections
of intervals with tolerances. If we consider a voter’s interest region to be an
Intersection Theorem 9
Figure 3.2 An example of nonintersecting voters.
interval and consider the size of a voter’s maybe region to be the tolerance,
then it can be shown the resulting tolerance graph is the same as the inter-
section graph of the voter. Notice, however, that this does require that the
sizes of the two maybe regions for every voter be the same. Since, in this
limited case, the graphs are the same, we see that any result for tolerance
graphs is also true for intersection graphs.
Of special importance is the fact that tolerance graphs are perfect, since
the fact that intersection graphs (for one level of approval) are perfect played
a major role in the proof of Theorem 2.3 in Berg et al. (2010). The restriction
that the size of the maybe regions must be the same can be lifted if we con-
sider bitolerance graphs (where there is a separate left and right tolerance),
which are also discussed in Golumbic and Trenk (2004).
3.3 Intersection Theorem
We were able to prove an initial result regarding agreement among voters
that pairwise intersect.
Theorem 3.1. If every pair of voters intersect, then there is some platform that is
in every voter’s interest region, and at least one voter’s approval region.
Proof. Since every pair of voters intersect we know that their interest re-
gions pairwise intersect as well. Since the interest regions are closed in-
tervals Theorem 2.2 tells us that there is some platform, p, that is in every
voter’s interest region. If p is in some voter’s approval region then we are
done. Therefore assume that p is in every voter’s maybe region.
Let
a = max ({Lv, lv, rv, Rv|v ∈ V} ∩ (−∞, p]) .
That is, a is the closest boundary of a maybe region to p that is also to the
left of p. If a = lu or a = ru for some voter u then a is the desired point.
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Figure 3.3 Example for intersection theorem.
Since a is the closest boundary point to the left a is still in the interest region
of every voter except u and a is in the approval region of u (a might be in
the approval region of other voters if a is a boundary point for more than
one voter). We see that a cannot equal Ru for any voter u since that would
mean that p /∈ Iu. However, a could equal Lu for some voter u.
In this case, let
b = min ({Lv, lv, rv, Rv|v ∈ V} ∩ (p,∞)) .
If b equals lw or rw for some voter w we are done. We note that b cannot
equal Lw for any voter w since then p /∈ Iw. If u = w then b = lu since
Lu ≤ p < lu, and b is the desired point. Otherwise u 6= w and b = Rw for
some voter w. Since this would imply that rw < Lu ≤ p < Rw < lu we
see that voters w and u do not intersect, which is a contradiction. Therefore
the only valid cases show that there is a platform in every voter’s interest
region, and at least one voter’s approval region.
We see that we cannot guarantee any better result by examining Fig-
ure 3.3. In this figure we add new voters that are completely contained
inside the previous voter’s right maybe region. This guarantees that any
point that is in the interest region of the last voter added will be in the
maybe region of all the other voters. Thus we can find a platform that is in
the approval region of some voter, and the maybe region of all other voters.
We cannot, however, find a platform that is in the approval region of more
than one voter and the maybe region of all other voters. We can have an
arbitrary number of voters in this arrangement.
Chapter 4
Bounding Maximum Value by
Percentage of Edges in
Intersection Graph
In this chapter we consider the platform with the maximal amount of ap-
proval in terms of how many edges are in the intersection graph for the
voters. An intersection graph with relatively many edges represents a set
of voters for which there is a large amount of agreement. Thus we will
show that a high percentage of possible edges will lead to a platform that
is in the interest regions of a large percentage of voters. Both a lower and
an upper bound for these values are determined.
Let N denote the number of voters. Let the number of edges in the
intersection graph divided by (N2 ) be called the pairwise agreement proportion
(denoted α). We see that this is the percentage of possible edges. Let the
maximum value of V(p) divided by N be called the agreement proportion
(denoted β). We see that this is the percentage of possible value.
We will prove upper and lower bounds involving α and β. The devel-
opment of these results is motivated by Abbott and Katchalski (1979) who
proved a similar result for interval graphs.
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4.1 Bounds
Theorem 4.1 (Lower Bound). We first establish a lower bound for β. The agree-
ment proportion β satisfies the lower bound
β ≥ 1−
√
1− α
2
,
where α is the pairwise agreement proportion.
Proof. We will interpret our voter’s interest regions as intervals so that we
can apply the Abbott and Katchalski result. Let G be the intersection graph,
and let E be the number of edges in G.
Consider the interval graph that arises from letting each voter’s interest
region be an interval. We call this graph G′ and call its number of edges E′.
Let α′ be the percentage of edges for this graph, and let β′ be the percentage
of value for the intersection of these intervals.
Since intersection for voters is more restrictive than intersection for in-
tervals, we see that E ≤ E′. Thus α = E/(N2 ) ≤ E′/(N2 ) = α′. Therefore we
see that
1−√1− α ≤ 1−√1− α′.
Abbott and Katchalski’s results tells us that
1−√1− α′ ≤ β′.
All that remains to show is that β′ ≤ 2β. If the value of β′ comes from plat-
form p, then we have that 2V(p) ≥ Nβ′ since each voter that contributes
one to Nβ′ contributes at least 1/2 to V(p). Since β is the maximum per-
centage, 2Nβ ≥ 2V(p) which completes the proof. Figure 4.1 shows the
graph of this lower bound.
Before providing an upper bound for β we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. If there is a platform that is in the left maybe set of two voters then
those two voters intersect.
Proof. Let the voters be u and v. Consider min{lu, lv}. Since this point is in
the approval region of one of the voters, and is in either the maybe region
(if lu 6= lv) or the approval region (if lu = lv) of the other we see that these
voters intersect.
A similar proof shows the same result when there is a platform that is
in the right maybe set of two voters.
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Figure 4.1 Graph of lower bound.
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Theorem 4.2 (Upper Bound). The upper bound of the agreement proportion
with respect to the pairwise agreement proportion satisfies the equation(
N
2
)
α ≥
(
Nβ
2
)
where N is the number of voters.
Proof. Let G be the intersection graph, and let E be the number of edges in
G. Assume that the platform, p, that maximizes the value be in the approval
region of l voters and the maybe region of k voters (so thatV(p) = l+ k/2).
We will count the number of edges guaranteed to exist among these
l + k voters. Of the k maybe voters, let p be in left maybe region of k1 of
them, and in the right maybe region of k2 of them. We see that we have
k1 + k2 = k. The l voters that have p in their approval region all intersect
with each other for ( l2) edges. The l voters that have p in their approval
region also intersect with each of the k voters that have p in their maybe
region for lk edges. The k1 voters that have p in their left maybe region
all intersect with each other by Lemma 4.1 for (k12 ) edges. Likewise the k2
voters that have p in their right maybe region all intersect with each other
for (k22 ) edges. Thus
E ≥
(
l
2
)
+ lk +
(
k1
2
)
+
(
k2
2
)
.
Expanding this out gives
E ≥ l(l − 1)
2
+ lk +
k1(k1 − 1)
2
+
k2(k2 − 1)
2
=
l2 − l + 2lk + k21 − k1 + k22 − k2
2
.
Recall that −k1 − k2 = −k. We therefore have that
E ≥ (l
2 + lk/2+ lk/2− l − k/2) + lk + k21 + k22 − k/2
2
.
Consider lk + k21 + k
2
2 − k/2. We have lk ≥ 0. Since (k1 + k2)2 = k21 +
k22 + 2k1k2, we see that k
2
1 + k
2
2 = k
2 − 2k1k2. Since k1 and k2 are subject to
the constraint k1 + k2 = k we see that the maximum value of k1k2 is k2/4.
Thus k21 + k
2
2 ≥ k2 − k2/4. It is easy to verify that
k2 − k
2
4
− k
2
≥ k
2
4
for k ≥ 2.
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Figure 4.2 Graph of upper bound for selected values of N.
For k = 1 we have, without loss of generality, k1 = 1 and k2 = 0 so
k21 + k
2
2 − k/2 = 1/2 ≥ 1/4 = k2/4. For k = 0 we have k1 = k2 = 0, so
k21 + k
2
2 − k/2 = 0 ≥ 0 = k2/4. Thus for all k we have lk + k21 + k22 − k/2 ≥
k2/4.
This leaves us with
E ≥ l
2 + lk/2+ lk/2+ k2/4− l − k/2
2
=
(l + k/2)(l + k/2− 1)
2
=
(
l + k2
2
)
.
Since E = (N2 )α and l +
k
2 = V(p) = Nβ this completes the proof.
Figure 4.2 shows this bound for selected values of N. We start with
N = 2 since α is not clearly defined for N = 1. The graph shows that for
large values of N this bound is nearly identical to α ≥ β2.
16 Bounding Maximum Value by Percentage of Edges in Intersection Graph
Figure 4.3 Example to illustrate the demonstrated bounds.
4.2 Example of Bounds
Consider the set of voters shown in Figure 4.3. The dotted line shows a
platform that has maximal value. We see that this collection has five voters
(N = 5), seven edges in the intersection graph, and V(p) = 2.5. Thus for
this example α = 7/(52) = 7/10 and β = 2.5/5 = 1/2. To see that these
values of α and β satisfy the bounds we note that
1
2
≥
1−
√
1− 710
2
≈ 0.226 and
(
5
2
)
7
10
= 7 ≥
(
5 12
2
)
=
15
8
.
Chapter 5
Application of Bounds on
Relative Sizes
We saw previously in Figure 3.3 that allowing the interest regions to get
arbitrarily small or large caused us to be unable to make strong claims
about intersections of approval regions. In this chapter we look at the con-
sequences of placing bounds on the relative sizes of the different regions.
5.1 Permissiveness and Wavering Ratios
For a set of voters,V, we define the permissiveness ratio, p(V), as
p(V) = max
u,v∈V
{
ru − lu
rv − lv
}
.
Since we assume the set of voters is finite this maximum will exist. Intu-
itively this is the ratio between the longest and shortest approval regions,
which is a measure of how much more permissive some voters may be than
others. Note that the corresponding minimum would be given by 1/p(V),
so this bounds the ratio between the approval regions both above and be-
low. We also define the wavering ratios. Let
w(V) = min
v∈V
{
lv − Lv
rv − lv ,
Rv − rv
rv − lv
}
.
Intuitively this represents how small a maybe region can be compared to
the approval region for each voter, how unwavering some voters may be.
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Figure 5.1 Variable sizes for approval regions.
For the following discussion we will keep the sizes of the left and right
maybe regions the same for each voter, in which case we can simply write
w(V) = min
v∈V
{
lv − Lv
rv − lv
}
.
We also let
W(V) = max
v∈V
{
lv − Lv
rv − lv
}
.
This represents how large a maybe region can be compared to the approval
region for each voter.
Consider the set of voters, V, shown in Figure 4.3. Some computation
shows that p(V) ≈ 5.22, w(V) ≈ 0.01 and W(V) ≈ 7.91.
If we allow sets of arbitrary numbers of voters to be constructed with-
out considering these three bounds then we can arrive at arrangements of
voters that limit the number of overlapping approval regions. The exam-
ple from Figure 3.3 has bounds for w(V) and W(V) but not for p(V). Fig-
ure 5.1 shows an example of such an arrangement for a bound on p(V) but
no bound on w(V). This example, which can easily be generalized to an
arbitrary number of voters, shows that situations can arise with only one
approval region in the intersection of all interest regions.
Assuming that all voters pairwise intersect we now look at how many
approval regions are guaranteed under specific values of the three bounds.
Theorem 5.1. Let V be a set of N voters such that p(V) = 1 and w(V) =
W(V) = µ. That is to say, all the approval regions are the same size and each
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maybe region is µ times as big as the approval region (also guaranteeing they are
the same for all voters). If all voters pairwise intersect then there is some platform
that is in the approval region of ⌈
N
1+ dµe
⌉
voters.
Proof. Consider any dµe+ 2 voters inV. I claim that there is a point that is
in the approval region of two of them. Since they all have approval regions
of the same size let that size be denoted x. Then we see that the size of each
maybe region is µx. Let u be the voter for which lu is smallest. Let v be the
voter for which rv is greatest. Voters u and v must still intersect so these
lu and rv can be no further than x + µx + x apart. Equality occurs when
Ru = lv (or equivalently ru = Lv).
Since these were the extremal voters all other approval regions fall be-
tween these points. Since (dµe+ 2)x ≥ (µ+ 2)x we see that there is no way
to place dµe + 2 approval regions into the given space without two over-
lapping (remember endpoints are included in the approval regions). Thus
we see that the approval regions of the voters are (dµe + 2, 2)-agreeable.
Recall that Theorem 2.3 tells us that there is therefore a platform in at least
N(2− 1)
(dµe+ 2)− 1 =
N
1+ dµe
approval regions. Since there is a platform in at least this many approval
regions, and since the platform must be in an integer number of approval
region, we can add a ceiling function to the expression.
We take some time here to interpret this result. The first thing to note is
the discrete jumps that occur in the bound at each integer. The easiest way
to visualize a situation where the is no platform in a greater number of
approval regions is to place all of the approval regions into columns of ap-
proximately equal size. Figure 5.2 shows that when µ = 3 we cannot have
five columns of approval regions that don’t overlap, because endpoints are
included in approval regions.
Thus the greatest number of columns that could be created is four, which
is consistent with the result from the theorem. However, if µ were any big-
ger than 3 we could place a little bit of a gap between each of the endpoints
of the approval regions in the columns. Thus if µ is any larger than 3 we
can construct examples with five columns. We will not be able to have six
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Figure 5.2 An example of five voters when µ = 3.
columns until µ exceeds 4. Thus the bound only depends on dµe. If we
were to create an alternate definition for approval regions where endpoints
are not included this would not eliminate the discrete jumps, but would
only cause the integer values of µ to be on the other side of the jump. We
now consider the case where there are maybe regions of different sizes.
Lemma 5.1. Let V be a set of N voters such that p(V) = 1 and W(V) = µ.
That is to say, all the approval regions are the same size and each maybe region is
no more than µ times as big as the approval region. If all voters pairwise intersect
then there is some platform that is in the approval region of⌈
N
1+ dµe
⌉
voters.
Proof. Since all voters have approval regions of the same size, let that size
be denoted x. Note that if we were to extend the maybe regions of all voters
to be of length n · x then all voters will still pairwise intersect, and the ap-
proval regions are unchanged. We can then apply the result of Theorem 5.1
to see that there is a platform in the approval region of at least
⌈ N
1+n
⌉
vot-
ers.
This lemma tells us that allowing some voters to have smaller maybe re-
gions will not decrease the number of approval regions that overlap. Since
smaller maybe regions limit the potential for a voter to intersect all other
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voters we would expect that in many cases we could guarantee even more
overlapping approval regions than this lower bound. We consider some
conditions where there are maybe regions of different sizes among the vot-
ers, but for which this bound cannot be improved.
Theorem 5.2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n letVi be a set of voters such that w(V) = W(V) =
i. Let V =
n⋃
i=1
Vi be a set with N total voters. If pV = 1, all voters pairwise
intersect, and |Vi| ≥ |V1|+···+|Vi−1|i then there is a platform in the approval region
of ⌈
N
1+ n
⌉
voters, and no better bound exists.
Proof. We see by Lemma 5.1 that we can find a platform in the approval
region of ⌈
N
1+ n
⌉
voters. We now demonstrate an arrangement of voters in V that does not
have a platform in more approval regions. We will show by induction on
n that we can place these voters into approximately equal columns so that
no column has more than
⌈ N
1+n
⌉
voters in it.
When n = 1, we can place all voters (almost) equally into two columns
which hold
⌈N
2
⌉
and
⌊N
2
⌋
voters. Thus the bound cannot be improved. As-
sume that we have a total of N voters in k types and that they can be placed
in k + 1 columns as described. We see that no column has more than
⌈ N
1+k
⌉
voters in it. Now consider adding a set Vk+1 of N′ voters. Since these vot-
ers have a longer maybe region they can be placed in a separate column
so that they will still intersect all other voters. Since N′ is an integer and
by assumption N′ ≥ |V1|+···+|Vk |k+1 we see that we have at least as many vot-
ers in Vk+1 as were originally in the most populated column. We initially
place these voters into the new column and distribute the remaining vot-
ers among the columns so that any columns with one less voters are filled
first. When we are done we see that there will only be two possible size
for columns, differing by one only if we cannot fill all the columns equally.
Since we have N + N′ voters evenly split among k+ 2 columns we see that
the most voters that can be in any column is⌈
N + N′
1+ (k + 1)
⌉
.
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Thus we see that for the given constraints there is an arrangement such that
no platform is in more than
⌈ N
1+n
⌉
approval regions.
Figure 5.3 shows an example of the construction described in Theo-
rem 5.2 when |V1| = 3, |V2| = 5, |V3| = 8 and |V4| = 6. These numbers
satisfy the constraints of Theorem 5.2. We can also easily verify that the
voters pairwise intersect. The dotted lines show the “columns” created by
the construction. No approval regions in different columns overlap. We see
that the platform in the greatest number of approval regions is a platform
in one of the first two columns. These are in⌈
3+ 5+ 8+ 6
1+ 4
⌉
= d4.4e = 5
approval regions, as desired.
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Figure 5.3 Example for Theorem 5.2.

Chapter 6
Future Work
Many questions are left to be answered about approval voting with multi-
ple levels of approval. In Chapter 5 different bounds can be explored. Of
particular interest are bounds where approval regions are allowed to have
different sizes among voters.
In all the theorems currently proven we assume that all the voters pair-
wise intersect. I wish to reinterpret the Agreeable Society Theorem (Theo-
rem 2.3) to voting with two levels of approval by imposing some form of a
(k, m)-agreeable condition. I conjecture that this additional constraint will
give a ratio that acts multiplicatively with the ratio given in Theorem 5.1.
It is yet to be seen if the connection between approval voting with two
levels of approval and tolerance graphs can yield new theorems. Lastly,
the theory can be extended to account for more than two levels of ap-
proval. With arbitrary numbers of levels of approval each voter’s pref-
erences would look closer to a continuous function describing how much
they approve of each platform. The most general form would be to extend
the results to arbitrary functions.

Appendix A
Simulations
Source code is available at http://www.math.hmc.edu/seniorthesis/archives/2012/
cburkhart/cburkhart-2012-data.zip to create a random arrangement of voters
that can be used to test ideas and create new hypotheses. The program-
ing language used is Ruby. The program works by choosing two random
points between −5 and 5 (using the built in random number generator) to
be Lv and Rv. Then a random point is chosen between 0 and (Rv − Lv)/2
to represent the distance between the endpoint and the end of the maybe
regions (so that lv is defined as Lv added to this random value). Certain
statistics, such as α and β from Chapter 4, are also computed.
A.1 Limitations
Although this code is an interesting tool to examine some of the situation
that can arises, it does posses a number of limitations. For every voter this
code creates the size of the two maybe regions is equal. This is a natural
restriction when we wish to use a tolerance graph approach, but is not a re-
striction that needs to be adhered to in general. The boundary of −5 and 5
is probably not a restriction since any situation with a finite number of vot-
ers can be rescaled to fit into this range. However, the limits on how small
variables can be on a computer could prevent significantly small regions
for the voters, such as would be required for constructions like Figure 3.3.
Since all the voters are created using the same random process, for large
number of voters the outputs from this program look very similar. As such,
there tend to be no data to explore the extreme cases close to the upper and
lower bounds on α and β. This is demonstrated in Figure A.1 which shows
a plot of α versus β for twenty random configurations of 10 (red), 25 (green)
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Figure A.1 Plot of α versus β for randomly generated voters.
and 100 (blue) voters produced by the program. It can be seen that as the
number of voters increases the output from the program is increasingly
similar. Also shown in the figure are the upper and lower bounds derived
in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
A.2 Examples
The following is an example output of this code with fifteen voters. Fig-
ure A.2 shows the voters displayed with the spectrum. As we can see a
variety of different lengths for the approval and maybe regions were pro-
duced. There are also voters at varying positions along the spectrum. Fig-
ure A.3 shows the intersection graph of the voters. In the intersection graph
each vertex represents a voter and two vertices are joined by an edge if and
Examples 29
Figure A.2 An example of a fifteen-voter output from the code.
only if the corresponding voters intersect. The code also tells us that for
this graph α ≈ 58.1% and β = 615 .
30 Simulations
Figure A.3 The intersection graph for the fifteen voters shown in Figure A.2.
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